The Agreements on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures and Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) took effect in 1995. They allow WTO member countries to apply SPS and TBT measures to protect domestic human health, animal and plant health, and the environment. However, concerns that these measures create trade frictions and serve protectionist motives have been brought up frequently. For instance, the Philippines, in a complaint to the WTO in 2002, claimed that Australia's SPS measures on fresh fruit and vegetables had hurt its exporters unnecessarily. In 2010, Indonesia filed a WTO dispute against the United States (DS406) for imposing restrictions on cigarette additives thus affecting the production and sale of Indonesian clove cigarettes. In general, the implications of technical measures 1 on market access and welfare are more complex than traditional tax-based trade barriers measures, such as tariffs and countervailing duties, primarily because they often address market imperfections (asymmetric information, externalities). They tend to affect consumers' information set and behavior as well as producers' behavior. Thus they cannot be easily translated into a simple tax or price equivalent. Their welfare effects are fundamentally different as well. The presumption that the removal of technical measures is welfare-improving is not grounded in any economic theory, unlike for the removal of a trade tax by a small country.
From the perspective of exporters, the additional cost of complying with a stringent standard abroad could be high. Those compliance costs may include the fixed costs of upgrading the equipments and/or practice codes, gaining certificates, altering marketing strategies, etc. In addition, inspection procedures at custom points add to the variable cost of exporting. As a result, the compliance costs could significantly decrease export volumes, and drive small exporting firms out of a foreign market. This is the trade-cost effect, or the supply-inhibiting effect of technical measures, which corresponds to the conventional "standards as barriers" argument in the international development literature on market access (Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh 2001a) .
On the other hand, a technical measure may enhance the demand for imports if the measure is informative (Thilmany and Barrett 1997) . In the latter case, the measure signals a higher quality of the permitted imports via information disclosure such as trade marks, labeling requirements, and detailed description of certain attributes or restricting toxic residues. The quality improvement enhances consumers' demand for imports, as well as contributes to consumers' long-run health benefits (Marette and Beghin 2010) . This is the demand-enhancing effect, or the quality improvement effect of technical measures, corresponding to the "standards as catalyst" argument in the SPS/TBT debate. (The "standards as catalyst" argument also includes the claim that stringent foreign standards could trigger exporters to upgrade their supply chain, to access higher quality markets opportunities in the long-run, e.g., Jaffee and Henson 2005) . Therefore, a technical measure can affect trade volumes and/or the propensity to trade in either direction: a tighter standard promotes trade if its demand-enhancing effect dominates its trade-cost effect; it impedes trade if its demand-enhancing effect falls short of the trade cost effect. The analytical ambiguity of the impact of technical measures on international trade calls for a more careful empirical quantification and identification of the trade effects of these measures, a task we pursue in this investigation.
Gravity equation models are widely used to estimate bilateral trade flows and their determinants such as the attributes of trading countries (such as GDP, total production) and various trade cost terms (such as tariffs, distance, colonial ties, and preferential trade agreements), including certain technical measures imposed by the importing countries. The existing results accumulated so far on trade effects of technical measures are mixed. The estimated net effects of technical measures vary across products, country groups, and to some extent estimation methods with net trade effects spanning from significantly negative to significantly positive (Li and Beghin 2010) . For example, Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001a) predicted that 2002 EU harmonization of aflatoxin residue standards would reduce groundnut exports from Africa. This prediction could not be confirmed by Xiong and Beghin (2011) in an ex-post panel analysis. Jaffee and Masakure (2005) report that Kenyan fresh vegetable exporters benefited from the proliferation of food safety standards in Europe by successfully updating their supply chains. Anders and Caswell (2009) find that Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) reduces American's seafood imports from large exporting countries. Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008) show that agricultural exporters from the South are more likely to be hurt by rising TBTs and technical measures than their competitors from the OECD countries but that they measure can enhance trade in some sectors among OECD partners, while hindering trade or having no net trade effects in other sectors. Disentangling the separate impacts of technical measures on import demand and export supply would allow a cogent rationalization of these various outcomes. However, studies toward the identification of the two effects are rare to date. (As a case study on Japanese cut flowers, Yue and Lan (2009) show that estimates of the trade effect of SPS are biased when the induced quality changes are not considered).
We undertake to separately identify these supply and demand effects. This is a useful pursuit. First, the disentanglement of consumers' and producers' responses to an informative standard helps determine if the standard is driven by public awareness or potential protectionism. (Fugazza and Maur (2008) demonstrate the importance of modeling both the demand and supply-shift effects of technical measures in policy analysis using CGE models). In case consumers are found to be insensitive to the quality improvement induced by a higher standard, the new policy should be subject to further scrutiny for possible protectionism. For instance, the absence of direct demand-enhancing effect could also be consistent with policies addressing long-term deleterious health or environmental effects valued by society but overlooked by consumers of the good affected by the technical measure (e.g., Peterson and Orden 2008) .
Second, the disentangled approach provides grounds for better policy recommendation both for domestic consumers and development assistance to exporters in the South, potentially handicapped by technical measures. For example, the fairly common finding of negligible net trade effect of technical measures (e.g., Xiong and Beghin 2011) may dissimulate a potential demand-enhancing effect beneficial to consumers and mostly offset by exporters' inability to comply with the measures. The latter could lead to international assistance programs to exporters in the South.
Moreover, the disentanglement of the effects of SPS measures on consumers and producers makes possible the welfare evaluation of a policy change. Disdier and Marette (2010) use an analytical framework to link the mercantilist aspects and welfare aspects of non-tariff measures and find that although antibiotic residue limits reduce crustaceans imports in US, EU, Canada, and Japan, they boost both domestic and international welfare. Therefore, a proper disentangling strategy would allow exploring how a change in SPS polices affects different agents in international trade. Identifying the two separate effects could also lead to better policy design by the social planner, especially in presence of externalities associated with trade. An optimum measure can be designed with proper knowledge of its impact on consumers.
We propose an econometric approach to disentangle the demand-enhancing effect and the trade-cost effect of any standard and apply the model to examine the impact of technical measures on agricultural trade among OECD countries in 2004. The two effects can be told apart based on two simple but essential facts. First, the maximum of the domestic standards and the foreign standards affects consumers' demand for imports: the domestic standards serve as the quality signal if the home country adopts stricter regulations than the exporting country; the foreign standards serve as the quality signal if higher standards are applied abroad. However, the difference in standards between the trading countries influences the trade costs of exporting firms:
a firm already meeting a stringent regulation in its home market can meet the standards in the country of destination easily or at no additional cost. For instance, seafood exporters from Canada are arguably better equipped to meet U.S. HACCP regulations than seafood exporters from Thailand because HACCP procedures are common in Canada.
We apply the model to investigate agricultural trade among OECD countries in 2004 and significantly refine the findings of Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008) . Technical measures facilitate intra-OECD agricultural trade, for those measures enhance consumers' demand for imports more than they handicap exporters' supply of exports. In a further disaggregated analysis of technical measures imposed on vegetable preparations primarily targeting mycotoxins, we find that these measures tend to in the net to induce additional intra-OECD trade in vegetable products.
In contrast, technical measures affecting dairy products tend to decrease the trade among OECD countries in their net effect. Demand enhancing effects are found in both of these sectors.
In what follows, we provide a conceptual model leading to a specification disentangling the two effects of technical measures. Then we apply the model to empirically examine the impact of technical measures on agricultural trade among OECD countries in 2004. Section 4 concludes the analysis and discusses possible extensions.
The modeling approach
Our analytical framework characterizes the separate impact of technical measures on the demand for imports and the supply of exports. In equilibrium, a generalized gravity equation model emerges and provides a specification to be estimated which preserves the identification of the separate impacts on domestic consumers and foreign exporters. Welfare implications are also discussed.
The import demand
The goods available in the economy are differentiated by sectors and by country of origins (Armington 1969 (4) assumes full compliance of all firms: a firm must meet its domestic standards in the first place, and it has to improve the quality of its exports to meet the foreign standards if selling to a destination where stricter standards apply. In the latter case, consumers in the destination country care about the higher domestic quality signal. However, if a foreign firm has a quality exceeding the importing country's quality requirement, then consumers in the latter country react to the stricter quality requirements adopted by the exporting country. 
The export supply
We assume a representative producer for each sector in each country. The products sold by this representative producer at different destinations are imperfect substitutes because the producer has to further modify the products to meet the local quality requirements in each destination country (re-packaging, re-labeling, etc). For example, U.S. apples to be sold in Japan are not exactly the same as U.S apples consumed domestically (Calvin, Krissoff, and Foster 2008) . We further assume the representative producer of good in country is endowed with a production capacity and a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) technology (Geraci and Prewo 1982; Bergstrand 1985) . The CET technology allows the exporter to transform products prepared for different destinations. The problem for the representative producer is to decide which countries to export to and how much to export to each foreign market. Let The solution to (5) yields the following export supply functions in value terms:
(6) ,
is the producer price index for sector in country reflecting the cost of exporting to all possible destinations. Equation (6) suggests that the supply of exports is positively related to the production capacity of the exporting country and the price of the goods, but negatively related to trade cost terms.
s i
With the empirical investigation in mind, and as standard practice in gravity equation models, we parameterize sij τ as
is the bilateral tariff rates in sector ; is the distance between country and The new source of trade cost in (7) 
The equilibrium
In equilibrium, the import demand equals the export supply in each sector and for each country pair. By imposing the market clear condition, , we can solve for the equilibrium trade value, , and the equilibrium price, , in sector for the exporting country i and the importing country (6) 
It can be noted from (8a) that the equilibrium price is increasing in the importing country's income level, , the quality of the imports, j Y sij δ , and the trade cost between the two countries, sij τ ; but it is decreasing in the exporting country's total supply capacity, . Equation (8b) τ . Substituting (4) and (7) into (8b), and taking logarithms lead to following characterization of equilibrium bilateral trade flows
Equation (9) Besides noting the disentangling the two effects of SPS/TBT measures, our specification leads to several remarks. First, the inclusion of tariffs as a determinant of trade remains essential to identify the model structure as in many gravity applications. Equation (9) shows that the trade effects of all other trade costs combine the price effect of tariffs (parameterθ ) to their specific impacts on unit cost of each other trade cost as shown in equation (7). Secondly, the estimated trade effects of technical measures may suffer from omitted variable bias if the technical measures adopted by the exporting countries are ignored. Equation (9) shows that trade flows are independent of the standards applied by the country of origin,
, if and only if
is, the exporting country has no technical measures of its own. Last, the recovered elasticities of substitution in traditional gravity equation models analyzing technical measures should be interpreted with caution. The elasticity recovered here, ( 1)(1 ) ( ) θ ε η ε η = − − − , includes both CES and CET parameters and provides information on consumers' taste patterns, as well as exporters' ability to transform products across destinations.
At last, we discuss some of the welfare implications of a new standard on good s by the importing country, specifically on its consumers' and foreign exporters' welfare. To characterize the welfare effect for domestic consumers, we substitute (2) and (8a) into (1a) to get the indirect utility function for country j as follows: the price of the good increases and welfare is reduced. Consequently, the net effect on the consumer surplus from consuming good s is presumably ambiguous. Secondly, the negative external effect shown in the second term of (10) The total welfare effect on the consumer is presumably ambiguous and is unlikely to be just determined by effect on the volume of trade as often assumed in gravity analyses of NTMs.
The quantification of the demand-enhancing effect and the impact on potential externalities is essential: the more information standards convey to consumers, and/or the more scientific evidence underlies the regulations, the weaker the presumption of shear protectionism and welfare losses. j Country 's new regulation affects foreign exporters' profits. By assumption, exporters from country face additional cost to continue selling in country i j . By substituting (6) and (8a) into ( It can be noted from (11) that the profit is increasing in the perceived quality of the imports, sij δ , in country j but decreasing in the trade costs, sij τ to meet the new standard. Hence, the importing country's new regulation has two direct offsetting effects on the profit of foreign exporters (higher willingness to pay in the importing country but higher trade cost to sell there). The relative size of these effects determines the direct impact of the new standard on profits.
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In summary, from the above discussion of equations (10) and (11), it is clear that technical measures and their stringency have complicate welfare implications requiring the disentanglement of their separate effects on import demand and export supply as also emphasized by Disdier and Marette (2010) , and Beghin et al. (2011) .
An empirical application
In this section, we apply the proposed model to examine the impact of technical measures on agricultural and food trade among OECD member countries using data for the year 2004. The data come from Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008) and COMTRADE. As in Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008) , we run a regression based on pooled data for all sectors and then separate regressions based on sectoral data with a detailed investigation of trade in dairy and cereal preparations. The dataset is rich but unfortunately is a pure cross-section without time variation. This constraint means that we can only identify the effects of variables that are not colinear in absence of time variation in the data. Accordingly, we re-write (9) as 
Data and empirical strategy
The data set largely draws upon Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008 Rubinstein (2008) use "days and procedures needed to start a business" for this purpose, but they also use the common religion dummy variable as an alternative due to the limit data on the above-mentioned variable. We choose the common language dummy variable as the exclude variable in our application. separately to see how different products have been affected by technical measure.
Results discussion
The estimation results for the intra-OECD agricultural trade in 2004 are reported in table [ Table 1 about here]
The above finding has important implications for small exporters, or firms that are just productive enough to overcome the fixed cost of trade (Melitz 2003; Chaney 2008) . The proliferation of technical measures places another hurdle for small firms to jump, which could drive them out of foreign markets although results show that higher willingness to pay is generated by the technical measures.
In terms of other trade determinants, tariffs and distance are shown to hinder trade; a common border, a colonial tie in history, or a common language fosters trade new partnership.
The protectionist NTBs are shown to be positively correlated with trade propensity, which is unexpected given the presumption of real trade impediment. [ Table 2 about here] Noticeably, the magnitude of the extensive margin is comparable to that of the intensive margin, for either effect. To gauge the net effect on both margins, we consider a simple case in which the importing country imposes a new technical measure while the exporting country doesn't. The net effect of this new regulation can be computed as the sum of the demand-enhancing effect and the trade-cost effect. As shown in the third row in table 2, the net effect is positive but not statistically significant on the intensive margin, which suggests that the bilateral trade volume would be barely affected by the new regulation although both supply and demand shift and welfare will be affected. However, the net effect is negative and statistically significant on the extensive margin, which indicates that the new measure is likely to create new trade partnership among OECD members. In other words, the technical measures enhance consumers' demand for imports more than they handicap exporters' supply of exports. These results substantially refine the previous findings of Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008) measures significantly add to the variable costs of trade in three sectors, and the fixed costs of trade in three sectors. We find positive trade-cost effects on the extensive margin for two sectors, which was surprising. One possible explanation is that the country-specific notifications of technical measures do not capture certain harmonization or mutually recognition of standards, which presumably reduces compliance cost considerably.
[ Table 3 about here]
Now we focus on two particular sectors, dairy products (HS-04) and cereal preparations (HS-19), in which both consumers and producers in OECD are found to be sensitive to technical measures. SPS/TBT issues in dairy products involve the use of Bst, a genetically engineered growth hormone that increases milk production, a dispute over mandatory pasteurization of cheese, and labeling of yogurts among others (Bureau and Doussin 1999) . [ Table 4 about here]
[ Table 5 about here]
We first discuss the results for dairy products. As shown in table 4, both the demandenhancing effect and the trade-cost effect bear the expected signs and turn out statistically significant. In terms of the magnitude, table 5 suggests that the technical measures on dairy products depress the supply of exports more than they enhance consumer's demand via information discloser and quality improvement. In fact, if an OECD importer adopts a new regulation while the trading partner doesn't, the new measure would reduce the likelihood of trade between the two countries, as the net effect on the extensive margin is negative and statistically significant. The above results suggest that although OECD consumers in general place a premium on the dairy products of higher quality, but the compliance costs borne by producers prevent them from adopting new technologies and capturing some of these markets.
Regarding cereal preparations, table 4 shows that both OECD consumers and producers seem to respond to technical regulations, with the demand-enhancing effect dominating the trade-cost effect in magnitude. Table 5 further confirms that agents on both sides of the market are affected by the technical measures, and that a new regulation is likely to increase the chance of intra-OECD trade in cereal preparations. The trade-promoting attribute of technical regulations in cereal products reflect several facts. OECD consumers are visibly concerned about mycotoxin contamination in food stuff and they are willing to pay a sizable premium for highquality cereal products. For OECD exporters who are able to conform to these costly regulations, trade expands. Not captured here but documented elsewhere is the fact that non-OECD exporters have difficulty meeting these standards (Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni 2008; Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh 2001b) inducing some changes in sourcing these products from new OECD suppliers meeting the stricter standards.
The estimates of other trade determinants, in both sectors, are in line with a typical gravity equation analysis. Tariffs are found to be trade-impeding; the farther apart two countries are, the less the bilateral trade there is; a shared border and a common language between trading partners facilitate trade; NTBs other than technical regulations do not significantly affect the intra-OECD trade in dairy products and cereal preparations.
Robustness and specification checks
In this subsection, we conduct several robustness checks for our empirical application.
One concern about the Heckman sample selection model is that it requires a variable in the selection equation to be excluded from the outcome equation. To see to the influence of the choice of excluded variable on results, we re-estimate the models when the colonial tie dummy variable in excluded. The associated results are almost identical to those reported in table 2 through 5.
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Another criticism toward the use of the Heckman sample selection model is that the estimates can be biased if trade flow exhibits heteroskedasticity. One remedy to the problem is to use the PPML approach proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) , in which the gravity equation is estimated in its multiplicative form instead of the logarithmically linear form and robust standard errors are used to accommodate heteroskedasticity. However, as Pham and Marin (2008) show, the PPML approach ignores the limited dependency of the trade flow and fails to explain the absence of trade. A variant to the PPML approach is the Zero-Inflated Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (ZIPPML) estimator which improves upon the standard PPML approach by accounting for the excessive zeros (Burger, van Oort, and Linders 2009) . One disadvantage with the ZIPPML approach is that the estimates vary as to the unit of the dependent variable varies.
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Nevertheless, we conduct the ZIPPML regressions and compare the results to those delivered by the Heckman models. In the augmented regressions, the demand-enhancing effects and the tradecost effects found are qualitatively similar except that the trade-cost effect becomes positive in the pooled regression. 14 The technical measures are shown to promote intra-OECD agricultural trade overall.
Conclusions
In this article, we propose a generalized gravity equation model in which the demand-enhancing effect and the trade cost effect of technical measures can be disentangled. The approach allows examining whether technical measures affects international trade, if any, through shifting consumers' demand curve via quality information disclosure, or shifting exporters' supply curve via imposing compliance costs, or both. An application of the approach to the intra-OECD agricultural trade in 2004 suggests that technical measures foster trade within OECD because these measures enhance consumers' demand for imports more than they hamper exporters'
supply of exports. Although we do not investigate North-South trade, our findings are relevant to the debate on "standards as barrier to or catalyst for trade." We find that the willingness to pay of consumers in OECD countries increases with stricter regulation affecting quality of food. Hence, these standards do create new market opportunities for exporters. We do not say anything on how exporters in the South succeed or fail to capture these markets. Nevertheless, the allegation that these technical measures are mostly driven by protectionism is invalid.
More disaggregated analysis reveals that technical regulations on dairy products affect both consumers and producers in OECD, with trade-cost effect slightly dominating the demandenhancing effect. On the other hand, technical measures on cereal preparations are shown to promote intra-OECD trade in the net because the enhancement of demand for high-quality cereal products outweighs the decrease of supply due to the associated compliance costs.
A promising extension would be to compile a panel data set and investigate the welfare effects of changes in technical measures. The time variation would allow the identification of all structural parameters in the proposed model and facilitate the computation of domestic and international welfares. Furthermore, one could also explicitly consider additive external effects on human/animal health and the environment based on currently available scientific evidence, which allows predicting the welfare implications of technical measures in the long-run. 0 s 1 Throughout the article, we use technical measures, SPS measures, and quality standards interchangeably.
2 All other factors affecting consumers' quality perception or evaluation are subsumed in δ . 3 Consumers are assumed to be cognizant of both domestic and foreign quality signals implied by the measures. This is consistent with a label stating that quality exceeds the standard in the destination market. 4 For the purpose of tractability, we do not explicitly model the endogenous choice of si Ω . However, in the empirical part, we partially account for countries' decision to export or not by using the Heckman sample selection model. Interested readers are referred to Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) for a detailed characterization of firms' exporting behavior. 5 These protectionist non-tariff barriers differ from the technical measures or SPS measures in that they do not constitute quality signals thus presumably impede trade by suppressing the supply of exports. See further discussion in Section 3. 6 We leave out the impact of domestic standards on domestic producers. Presumably, the effect can be either positive, if the domestic producers successfully comply with the regulations, or negative, if the associated compliance costs turn out significant. 7 Additionally, the new standard affects exporters' profitability in other destinations by altering the relative prices across foreign markets. We abstract from such indirect trade diversion effect in our discussion.
8 Some tariff and trade data are missing in Disdier, Fontagné and Mimouni (2008) . We complement the data with COMTRADE. Nevertheless, the bilateral tariff series is still incomplete. We drop those observations with missing tariffs. As a robustness check, we replace with missing tariffs with the sample averages at importer level. The results are qualitatively unchanged. 9 In the next subsection, we report the results from the two-step procedure because the high dimensionality makes the convergence of the full likelihood function difficult. is the Inverse Mill's Ratio as in Heckman (1979) , which corrects for the sample selection bias.
Applying the rules of conditional expectations, we have 
